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politicians: current expenditure typically produces immediate political returns, while 
politicians are still in office and, investment expenditure needs a time span to generate 
political dividends. This paper provides an empirical application to test the existence 
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1970 to 2001. We use the Pooled Mean Group Estimator technique to determine the 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Vast empirical literature on public finances in industrialised countries has developed 
in recent years with a special attention to European fiscal policy. Much of the 
attention has focused on the level of public spending or on budget deficit and the 
constraint imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Theoretically policy-
makers are described as opportunistic agents that (ab)use the policy tools to maximise 
their re-election chances; see Rogoff (1990) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 16; 
1990, Ch. 5) for studies on political budget cycles (PBC). Studies show that political 
budget cycles have restricted meaning in EU countries as a result of SGP budgetary 
restraints; see Schuknecht (2000) and Shi and Svensson (2002).  
Opportunistic budgetary manipulation in developed countries as those of the EU is 
difficult to determine because of the view that as democracy consolidates, government 
transparency increases, letting unaffected budget size. When voters sense 
opportunistic conduct on the part of governments, election polls are often used as way 
of setting scores, with penalising behaviour overriding rewarding ones. This is 
understandable since voters’ rational expectations associate any increase in aggregate 
expenditure as a sign of tax increase in the future. Several studies show that 
opportunistic political cycles achieve an appropriate end in countries whose 
democratic governments are relatively new or weak; see for example Akhmedov and 
Zhuravskaya (2004) who study the Russian regional case and Brender and Drazen 
(2005) who examined 68 countries, including well-established and new democracies. 
Hallerberg and Strauch (2002), Mulas-Granados (2003) and Buti and Noord (2003) 
found controversial evidence of electoral budget manipulation in pre-election years in 
EU that led to high deficits. 
 Independently of the major or minor evidence of a political budget cycle in EU in 
terms of size, it appears that overall budget manipulation is more easily perceived by 
voters than when targeted expenditures increase at the expense of non-targeted 
expenditures. In fact, a bias on public expenditure composition is often claimed either 
because current expenditure is observed as rising faster than capital expenditure near 
election periods or increase in transfer payments in pre-election periods are detected 
with immediate tax lifts following. 
Surprisingly, however, little attention has been given to the public expenditure 
composition or the budget partition between current and capital expenditure in the 
framing of developed countries. Drazen and Eslava (2004) is one of the few studies 
available and point out that opportunistic electoral cycle in developed countries are 
mainly observable at the budget composition rather than on aggregate fiscal spending. 
Eslava (2005) extends the analysis by observing specific targeted expenditures 
believed influence the electoral outcome as a result of opportunistic manipulation. 
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Given the lack of empirical work that test for the presence of electoral cycles on 
public expenditure composition and the contradictory results that aggregate budget 
manipulation carry near elections, we look to shed further light on the issue. We 
examine whether election periods coincide with political budget cycles when we take 
expenditure categories into consideration, namely, current expenditure and capital 
expenditure. As such, the focus of this study is on the electoral manipulation of 
government expenditures, leaving aside analysis of government revenues based on 
potential electoral cycle. We use central government expenditure data collected for 
former 15 EU member states during 1970 to 2001. 
In Figure 1, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, and Finland support our analysis 
that manipulation on public expenditure composition between the post election year 
and the pre election year favours current expenditure increase. This occurs regardless 
of the degree of democratic maturity between EU countries and their economic 
dimension. 
However, the SGP has a forceful role in moving public expenditure composition 
manipulation away from current expenditure, observed in decreases from 86% of the 
pre-election periods in the 70s to 69% in the 80s and 66% in the 90s. The breadth of 
public expenditure manipulation also decreased from a 1.9 percentage points current 
expenditure average in the 70s to a 1.1 percentage points expenditure average in the 
following two decades. 
 
[ ]insert figure 1 about here  
 
Through data on the 15 EU member states, the research focus is based on public 
expenditure cycles and its relation to election terms. Empirical findings show that 
firstly elections continue to play an important part in the shaping of public expenditure 
cycles in the EU. Central governments increase their share of current expenditure 
whenever elections draw near. Secondly, when we look at the subset of countries 
where coalition governments dominate, budgetary bias in favour of current 
expenditure is reinforced. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background 
and raises some questions on the issue. Section 3 describes the variables employed 
and respective data sources. Section 4 reports on procedures used in the estimation 
process and section 5 presents the results of the empirical application. Section 6 
concludes the paper.  
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Theoretical background 
 
Theory predicts that political budget cycles become less prevalent as information 
becomes more symmetric, as voter awareness increases and as democracy evolves. In 
well established democracies, as in the EU, with high standards of government 
transparency, budget manipulation around election times should not be expected at 
aggregate levels, as voters sense such manipulations are opportunistic and tend to 
penalise governments in upcoming elections. Public choice theory claims that 
politicians maintain own selfish interests that are not completely contingent on re-
election concerns. If politicians perceive that budget manipulation of certain 
expenditure categories will render other political dividends and if re-election chances 
are not too heavily affected, politicians are still motivated to manipulate budget items 
for selfish gain.  
Barreira and Baleiras (2005) propose a theoretical model that shows that 
manipulation on expenditure categories is to be expected even when voters hold 
complete information on the extent of budget manipulation, in this way compromising 
public expenditure mix. The driving force behind this type of behaviour from 
politicians is twofold:  
(i) politicians are uncertain of reappointment and as such prefer certain ego-
returns to an expected rewards from office from prospective employers in the 
event of nonreelection;1  
(ii) expenditure categories do not necessarily produce political dividends in 
simultaneous time frames: current expenditure typically produces quick 
political returns while politicians are still in office, however, capital 
expenditure requires some time to generate political dividends. This time lag 
on utility achieved from capital expenditure causes politicians to spend more 
on current expenditure in pre-election periods even if this is not in tune to 
voter preferences in terms of public expenditure composition. 
The framework consists of a budgetary cycle of two periods, denoted i, i = 1,2 
whereby the incumbent must decide the budgetary shares of consumption ( gA ) and 
capital expenditure ( gB ) for each period, with g gA B+ = 1, for simplicity. An 
incumbent decides on the expenditure composition at the beginning of each period 
and his/her utility from public expenditure is v gi   for i A B= , , which means he/she 
has no prior bias for any type of outlay. This satisfaction can only be acquired while 
the incumbent is in office. Additionally, ( )v ⋅  is twice continuously differentiable, with 
' 0,  ' 0v v> < . Any decision an incumbent makes on consumption expenditure will 
                                                          
1
 Only in office politicians can extract a certain level of utility. Any political dividends that can only 
be attained after elections enter probabilistically into politicians’ utility. 
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yield immediate political dividend payoff, i.e. during the same period the expenditure 
is incurred. However, any euro spent on capital expenditure during period 2 will only 
give the incumbent utility in the following period if re-elected, an outcome that is 
uncertain. This delay phenomenon also occurs in period 1. However, as capital 
expenditure decisions reached in period 1 become perceptible in period 2, the 
incumbent’s utility from that expenditure is certain. Moreover, there is an election 
after period 2 and the incumbent knows that there are job opportunities besides 
government positions, in case of electoral defeat. In such case he/she has the 
possibility to be employed by business community and earn an income y. The 
satisfaction from the outside payoff is ( )x y , with ' 0x > , which is obtained if the 
incumbent loses the election.  
Voters decide their ballot based on an assessment of the incumbent’s performance. 
Such assessment is captured by s, where 
s a w g w g a w g w gA A B B= + + − +
1 2 1 21          , 
with ' 0,  ' 0w w> < , and parameter a  ( a ∈ 0 1, ) represents the voters’ preferences for 
budget composition between consumption and capital expenditure. When 
a a> 0 5 05.  < .  , a bias for consumption (capital) expenditure is observed. Re-election 
probability, pi , is thus a function of voters’ satisfaction level: pi pi= s  , [ [0,1pi ∈ and 
pi '> 0 . If we assume that voters prefer no cycle ( 0.5a = ) during the two-period 
tenure, then, as the difference between gA  and gB  increases for each period, s  
becomes smaller reducing the chances for the incumbent’s re-election. Business 
community, as part of the electorate, shares voters’ preferences. Hence, the 
politician’s outside income is endogenously formed as ( )y y s= , with 0y′ > . 
The incumbent’s inter-temporal utility function can be observed as: 
U v g v g v g v g x yA B A B= + + + + −
1 1 2 2 1           pi pi . 
Formally, the fiscal choice of period 1 generates an ego return v gA1  in period 1 
and an ego return v gB1   in period 2; the fiscal choice of period 2 induces ego return 
v gA
2  in period 2 and an expected ego return piv gB2  in period 3, if re-elected. 
Moreover, period 3 expected utility, in case of electoral defeat, is given by 
1− pi   x y . 
From this framework emerges a prediction that can be empirically tested. 
 
Proposition 1. The inter-temporal political expenditure cycle.  
Even when the electorate shows no preference for a cycle a = 05.  ,  
i) a political budget cycle is found in the pre-election period, given by 
gA
2 05> . , and 
ii)  there is no cycle in the post-election period, gA1 05= . . 
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In interpreting this result we can say that by taking into consideration the chance of 
losing the upcoming contest and since capital expenditure in period 2 flows 
probabilistically forward into the next period utility, the incumbent is led to discount 
the future utility from being in office according to re-election prospects. Under this 
framework, the incumbent has thus an incentive to spend on consumption expenditure 
rather than on capital expenditure. 
The choices of the EU framework for the empirical application relies on 
assumptions the theoretical model considers regarding information voters possess. 
With the degree of information voters receive, consequent of a consolidating 
democratic regime, surfaces the adequacy of empirically testing the theoretical 
prediction on a set of stabilised democracies, such as those within the EU. According 
to Islam (2003), findings show that EU countries2 comprise the set of countries that 
better represent information transparency. Islam provides a “transparency” index that 
measures the frequency with which economic data are published in countries around 
the world.3 The spread of such information assumes greater accuracy in developed 
societies since it is commonly accepted that the electorate absorbs an extensive array 
of information through the news media.4 Information access allows voters to better 
measure the performance of politicians with relatively low cost. 
We propose an empirical application to validate the hypothesis formulated in the 
theoretical background. We look to identify manipulation in the budget mix, 
opportunistically-induced by central governments, i.e., the budget weight associated to 
current and capital expenditure near election periods, which lead to a political budget 
cycle. In the next section, we present the dependent and independent variables used 
for estimation purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 OECD countries for example include countries with significantly differentiated democracies, 
considering European consolidated democracies and relatively recent democracies like Slovak 
Republic, Poland or Hungary. As such, a much more heterogeneous degree of political information, 
accessible to voters, is expected on OECD countries. 
3
 Nine of the fifteen EU countries represent the highest rank in the transparency indicator, analogous 
to countries like the United States, Canada and Australia. Countries with high-income levels are argued 
to carry levels of  “transparency” that are twofold, with the exception of some oil producing countries. 
4
 The WorldAudit Organisation conducted a survey on 186 countries which rated each country’s 
press freedom, studying both political and economic pressures on the media (Electronically available at: 
http://www.worldaudit.org). The score goes from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating less freedom. 
Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having “free” media, 31 to 60, “partly free” and 61 to 100, 
“not free”. When the EU comprised 15 countries, 7 countries scored below 15, 7 countries presented 
scores between 15 and 30 and only one achieved a score above 30.  
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Variables and data 
 
The current section describes the variables to be included in the empirical model 
specification: the dependent variable denominated EXP and 8 independent variables. 5 
The sample covers 10 EU countries6 for a period of 32 years. The countries 
considered in our analysis include: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. Published data are available on a 
year-to-year basis from 1970 to 2001. 
 
The dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is specified as being the difference between current and 
capital expenditure weights (EXP), which takes the value zero when the two weights 
are equal.7 Thus, the variable captures the bias of certain expenditure types, i.e., a 
positive value represents a bias towards current expenditure and a negative value 
indicates a bias towards capital expenditure. We impose fiscal conservatism ensuring 
that, in each year, an amount of public expenditure is normalised to one. We focus 
merely on the public expenditure mix effect discarding the overall public expenditure 
size effect. 
 
The independent variables 
 
In the empirical application we specify a model that includes electoral variables, given 
that our primary goal is to evaluate how elections determine government manipulation 
of the public expenditure mix, as well as other control variables to capture 
institutional and economic differences across countries. More precisely, the empirical 
model specified for estimation considers eight explanatory variables. Two dummies 
relating to legislative election dates (ELEC0 and ELEC1), the unemployment rate 
(UER), the consumer price index (CPI), government’s ideological position (IDEOL), 
                                                          
5
 See Appendix 1 for a detailed description of the variables used on the empirical model 
specification. 
6
 The sample covers the 15 countries that comprised the EU. For statistical reasons explained 
subsequently we use only a subset of countries in the empirical application. 
7
 Defining the dependent variable in such a way allows us to examine the budget bias towards one of 
the two types of public expenditure. Since full budget is the sum of current and capital expenditure, we 
can state that defining only the weight of the current expenditure will have the same effect, since current 
expenditure weight increases as capital expenditure weight decreases. However, the model does not 
look to explain the evolution of public expenditure components but rather how the deviation between 
the two components develop. 
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government’s power in the assembly (LPS), voter turnout (VPR) and population 
weight over than 65 years of age (POP65).8  
Our aim is to investigate the relationship between the electoral cycle and the budget 
composition bias towards current expenditure. In this sense, the first two explanatory 
variables included in the model specification are dummy variables corresponding to 
the two periods in which a government is in power: the pre-election and post-election 
periods. Following Schuknecht (2000)’s approach, we adopt as ELEC0 and ELEC1, 
respectively, as descriptors.9  
We include two economic variables in order to capture possible economic cycles 
that might restrain governments from public expenditure manipulation such as the 
unemployment rate (UER) and the consumer price index (CPI). Three political 
variables are also considered: the government’s ideological position (IDEOL), the 
government’s power to decide alone on public expenditure composition (LPS) and the 
voter turnout rate (VPR). 
In order to distinguish between opportunistic (office-seeking) and partisan 
motivations, we introduce a variable indicating ideologically induced bias on budget 
composition in our model specification, since parties that make up a government are 
not ideologically neutral. 
An ideological variable assumes a relevant feature because it provides information 
on governmental preferences regarding public expenditure.10 Given the classification 
of parties into a scale, we consider an IDEOL variable as defined in Appendix 1. The 
lower the IDEOL value the higher the expected budget bias towards current 
expenditure.11  
                                                          
8
 See Appendix 2 for a detailed variable data source list. The Appendix 3 presents the descriptive 
statistics by variable and country considered in the empirical model. 
9
 There are several approaches proposed in the literature for the definition of the electoral dummies. 
After analysing the alternative specifications, namely those proposed by Blais and Nadeau (1992), by 
Dalen and Swank (1996), by Franzese (2000a), by Carmignani (2000), by Chang (2001), by Shi and 
Svensson (2002), by Huber, Kocher and Sutter (2003) and by Mulas-Granados (2003), we considered 
the Schuknecht’s approach the most reasonable to capture the phenomena this work looks to develop. 
10
 It is commonly accepted that left-wing parties tend to spend more on current expenditure than 
right-wing parties. Cusack (1997) shows that in industrialised democracies, during 1955 to 1989, 
ideological preferences of ruling parties and levels of governt spending are related. Left-wing parties 
tend to favour redistribution, thus providing greater public expenditure while right-wing parties prefer 
the untrammelled workings of the market system, which reduces government spending. Dalen and 
Swank (1996) use Dutch data (1953-1993) to determine that left-wing cabinets attach greater 
importance to social security and health care while right-wing cabinets value expenditure on 
infrastructure and defence. 
11
 During the 70s, Greece, Portugal and Spain faced a dictatorial to a democratic transition. Under  
dictatorship, governments do not face reappointment concerns. With guaranteed reappointment, 
governments prefer to spend on current expenditure rather than on capital expenditure since the latter 
type of expenditure gives utility with a period delay. The incentive of dictatorial regimes to manipulate 
budget composition is greater when compared to democratic regimes. Accordingly, we consider the 
value for this variable to be zero during the period in which democracy is absent in Greece, Portugal 
and Spain. 
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The next political variable measures the parliamentary power of governments. We 
observe different realities across EU parliaments. Some EU countries have a much 
fractionated parliament, with many parties having a reduced share of total 
parliamentary seats. As would be expected, government coalitions are the likely 
outcome in such countries. Coalition governments are dominant in countries like 
Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Finland, for example. In 
contrast, however, Portugal, Spain, Greece and United Kingdom maintain a tradition 
of single party governments. 
In order to capture departures resulting from the relative differences from 
governments to induce a budget composition bias, we introduce the variable LPS that 
measures the weight of the larger party in a parliamentary assembly.12 We show later, 
through the empirical application, that single party governments do not perform 
equally to coalition governments, often revealing differences in terms of public 
expenditure manipulation across EU countries.13 
Governments are aware that by excessively manipulating public expenditure, 
reelection may be at stake. In the proposed model, we present an innovative feature 
that contemplates voters as do not being induced in error by fiscal illusion. As such, 
the voter turnout rate (VPR) might be a constraining force on a government’s freedom 
to manipulate public expenditure,14 a hypothesis that we look to empirically validate. 
If we believe that voters have no preference bias regarding public expenditure 
composition, we can still expect an increase on current expenditure in pre-election 
years. Firstly because governments are uncertain about re-appointment and secondly 
because capital expenditure generates an ego-return with a one-period delay. Given 
these circumstances, governments know that the higher the turnout rate,15 the greater 
the electoral fall will be when public expenditure deviates from that desired by voters. 
Greater voter turnout expressing dissatisfied to government expenditure suggests the 
                                                          
12
 The importance of government’s polarisation to the electorally-induced manipulation of public 
expenditure is well documented and derives from two facts. Firstly, is expected to feel less responsible 
for budget options taken since the probability of reelection is substantially smaller compared to a one 
party government.  As the re-election chances lessen, the party in power is dissuaded from upkeep 
concerns, increasing budget bias during office. Secondly, attrition is greater where a leading party of 
considerable size in a ruling coalition does not exist, thus leading to more systematic public expenditure 
manipulations. 
13
 Several studies on the coalition government effects on budget performance like Roubini and 
Sachs (1989), de Haan, Sturm and Beekhuis (1999), Volkering and de Haan (2001) and Huber, Kocher 
and Sutter (2003) show that governments in coalition with multi-party composition tend to overspend, 
inducing an increase on budget deficit. 
14
 Hicks and Swank (1992) support this argument establishing a positive relation between turnout 
and welfare efforts of governments in western democracies. Also, Mueller and Stratmann (2003) report 
a positive link between electoral participation and the degree of distributive policies. 
15
 Belgium turnout rate is a particular case since more than 90% of voter participation has occurred 
during the last three decades, made compulsory by law. 
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need for a more responsible and loyal government to their constituents, less intent on 
budget manipulation. 
Finally, we include a social variable, POP65, which corresponds to the weight of 
the population over 65. This variable looks to capture budget composition bias 
towards current expenditure induced through social transfers and health care 
expenditure. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Panel data unit root tests 
  
Testing for unit roots in time series is common practice among empirical studies.16 
However, testing for unit roots in panels is a recent process, with major developments 
in nonstationary panel models originating in mid-1990s. Recent attention has been 
given to panel data issues arising from numerous time series procedures applicated to 
panels, such as nonstationarity, spurious regressions17 and cointegration. 
Levin and Lin (1992, 1993)18, Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and Maddala and Wu 
(1999), are authoritative references of panel unit root tests that rely on cross sectional 
independence. 
To deal with the presence of cross-sectional dependency, Chang (2002) proposed a 
panel unit root test based on non-linear instrumental variable (IV) estimation of the 
usual Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) type regression for each cross-sectional unit, 
using as instruments non-linear transformations of the lagged levels. The test statistic 
is defined as an average of individual IV t-ratios, which is asymptotically normal, and 
does not require the tabulation of critical values. 
In this paper, we apply the Im, Pesaran and Shin test, henceforth IPS, and the 
Chang panel data unit root tests. The panel unit root tests that we employ are joint 
                                                          
16
 See Stock (1994), Maddala and Kim (1998), and Phillips and Xiao (1998) for a overview of unit 
root tests in time series.  
17
 Considering two random vectors itY  and itX that are ( )1I , or equivalently, nonstationary, and 
without cointegration between them, then if a time series regression for a certain i  is performed, the 
regression coefficient will have a nondegenerative limit distribution and the regression is characterised 
as spurious. The problem is only extenuated when the panel has large cross sectional and time series 
dimensions. 
18
 The Levin and Lin test treats panel data as being composed by homogeneous cross-sections, thus 
performing a test on a pooled data series. The homogeneity hypothesis can be considered too restrictive 
since panel data can be composed by several cross-sections with different autoregressive coefficients. 
The main argument is that under the alternative hypothesis the same convergence rate across countries 
can bias the panel data unit root tests. Imposing homogeneity when coefficient heterogeneity is present 
in cross-sectional data can lead to misleading conclusions. The IPS panel data unit root test presents an 
alternative to overcome this restriction.  
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hypothesis tests in the sense that all units of a panel contain a unit root. When the joint 
null hypothesis is rejected it is possible that one or a few time series in the panel 
contribute to this finding. Cumulatively, given that these tests allow the autoregressive 
parameter to differ across cross sections under the alternative, then the rejection of the 
null hypothesis means that not all units of the panel contain a unit root. Effectively, a 
mixture of stationary and nonstationary time series can cohabit in the same panel data. 
Given the limitations associated with the previous panel unit root tests, we use an 
alternative test that allows for the presence of contemporaneous cross-correlation and 
heterogeneous serial correlation of the regression residuals as suggested by Breuer, 
McNown and Wallace (2002), hereafter BNW.  
The main advantage of BNW test is that it allow us to determine which cross 
sectional series reject the null hypothesis of a unit root and which do not. The BNW 
test uses a SUR framework for testing each panel unit under the null and the 
alternative hypothesis, exploiting the information in the error covariances to produce 
efficient estimators and potentially more powerful test statistics. The structure of 
hypothesis follows the ADF specification used in the IPS test procedure.  
The panel specification that is used in the SURADF estimation is described as 
'
1, 1 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1 1,
1
'
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.
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The null hypothesis is H i0 0:ρ =  for each time series of the panel. 
In general the SURADF is a more powerful test than the ADF test. For the I 0   
time series, BNW show, based on median rejection rates, that SURADF has twice the 
power or even more then a single equation ADF to reject the null hypothesis when the 
autoregressive coefficient on each I 0   time series is 0.90. However, these power 
gains vanish for an autoregressive coefficient between 0.95 and 0.99.  
The BNW test has however a disadvantage that emerges from the fact that the test 
statistics obtained through SURADF model have no standard distributions, implying 
the need for simulation of the necessary critical values. To compute these critical 
values it is necessary to consider the estimated covariance matrix for the system under 
analysis, the sample size and the number of panel units. This means that each study 
has its own critical values. 
Our main panel data unit root test results are presented in Appendix 4.19 As 
indicated, the rejection of the null of a panel unit root by IPS or Chang’s tests does not 
imply that all time series are stationary. Moreover, when we look at the BNW test the 
                                                          
19
 The detailed panel unit root tests are not reported here but are available from the author upon 
request. 
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rule appears to be a mix between stationary and non-stationary time series when the 
presence of cross sectional dependence is taken in to account.  
The panel unit root tests presented and the mixed characteristics of the panels 
considered in the empirical application serve as the underlying argument for our next 
analysis. 
When some of the individual time series that compose a panel show evidence of 
the existence of unit roots, then an estimation procedure like mean group estimation 
or pooled mean group estimation, described in the following sub-section, seems to be 
appropriate. This argument is reinforced when we suspect of heterogeneous 
autoregressive coefficients on the dependent variable across cross-sections. The mean 
group estimation or pooled mean group estimation can be used despite of the 
stationarity or nonstationarity characteristics of the regressors, thus constituting an 
important advantage. 
Further, under heterogeneous slopes and under small sample properties of panel 
time series estimators, Coakley, Fuertes and Smith (2001) show that by allowing for 
I 1  errors, which results in spurious time series regressions, the pooled and mean 
group estimators appear unbiased.  
 
Estimation procedure 
 
For our empirical application we use panel data of T and N, time dimension and cross-
section dimension, respectively. A country panel of the type we employ in this paper 
raises some important econometric methodological issues that are not always fully 
appreciated. There is increasing use of panel data samples in macroeconomics, based 
on development in the micro areas in which panels have traditionally been used. 
Dynamic models are, however, common in typical time series rather than static 
models. When the cross-section dimension is added and the lagged dependent variable 
is introduced, some important problems may surface as a result of heterogeneity in the 
model parameters. Some earlier studies employing panel data techniques did not allow 
for the possibility of panel heterogeneity beyond fixed effects. However, neglecting 
slope heterogeneity causes the disturbances to be serially correlated as well as 
contemporaneously correlated with the included regressor(s). Pesaran and Smith 
(1995) observe that the larger the degree of parameter heterogeneity, the greater the 
bias of these models. 
Traditional studies on electoral budget cycles using panel data techniques have 
relied on the fixed effects model. However, new branches of study have questioned 
the adequacy of this model which only allows heterogeneity across countries through 
the intercept, arguing that slope homogeneity seems unlikely when countries are at 
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different stages in their economic development and have diverse institutions, customs 
and social norms. In order to accommodate these problems, we apply the pooled mean 
group estimation method (PMG), recently proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(1999), to estimate dynamic specifications that impose homogeneity restrictions on 
long-run coefficients if and only when such restrictions are not statistically rejected.  
The PMG estimation procedure is an intermediate estimator between the total slope 
heterogeneity as is assumed by the Mean Group estimator (MG) proposed by Pesaran 
and Smith (1995) and the heterogeneity that is considered in the dynamic fixed-effects 
estimator (DFE). In fact, the PMG estimator proposed by Pesaran et al.  (1999) is 
more reliable than the previous two estimators discussed since it involves both 
pooling and averaging. The PMG estimator allows the intercepts, short-run 
coefficients and error variances to differ across countries, but imposes equality of one 
or more of the long-run coefficients. The main argument is that while it is implausible 
for the dynamic specification to be common to all countries, it is at least conceivable 
that the long-run parameters of the model may be common. In this sense, the PMG 
estimator imposes some homogeneity across countries compared with the MG 
estimator, which bears quite strong assumptions, like the independence of parameters 
and regressors, as well as strictly exogenous regressors. The PMG estimator allows for 
heterogeneity on the short-run effects absent in the DFE estimator which tends to 
underestimate the short-run effects and overestimate the average long-run effects 
under the presence of parameter heterogeneity.20 In this case, none of the usual 
remedies such as the instrumental variables estimation technique or variable 
differencing addresses the problem. 
Cumulatively, the PMG estimator reveals to be quite robust to outliers 21 as well as 
to the choice of lag order specified in the model; moreso than the MG estimator, 
whose estimates can be highly influenced by such factors. The PMG estimator is a 
two-step procedure: the first is the joint estimation of the homogeneous long-run 
coefficients across countries through the Maximum Likelihood procedure and the 
second is the estimation of the error-correction coefficients and the short-run 
parameters of the model, on a country-by-country basis. The PMG estimation has 
been applied in several areas of research, for instance in panel data studies on 
                                                          
20
 This statement is true regardless of the stationary or integrated nature of the variables. In fact, 
Pesaran, Smith and Im (1996) argue that with integrated variables under slope heterogeneity a 
differentiating cointegrating relation across countries is found. Thus, incorrectly imposing common 
slope parameter for all countries introduces an ( )1I component in the disturbances, leading to 
inconsistent parameter estimators, even in the static form.  
21
 In small samples, the MG estimator, being an unweighted average, is excessively sensitive to the 
inclusion of outlying country estimates. The PMG estimator performs better in this regard because it 
produces estimates that are similar to weighted-averages of the respective country-specific estimates, 
where the weights are given according to their precision (i.e., the inverse of their corresponding 
variance-covariance matrix). 
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economic growth (see for example, Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001), Bassanini, 
Scarpetta and Hemmings (2001), Asteriou and Price (2005), Gupta, Clements, 
Baldacci and Mulas-Granados (2005)); on labour markets changes (see Serres, 
Scarpeta and Maisonneuve (2002) and Fedderke, Shin and Vaze (2003)); on private 
saving rates growth (see Serres and Pelgrin (2002)); and on public budget balance 
growth (see Hallerberg and Strauch (2002)). 
To simplify the exposition and using an Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model−
ARDL(p,q,q,...,q) 22, the first step to PMG estimation is defined by the following 
equation: 
y y xit ij i t j
j
p
ij i t j
j
q
i it= + + +−
=
−
=
 λ δ µ ε, ' ,
1 0
,                   (1) 
with i N= 1 2, ,..., and t T= 1 2, ,...,  and where ity  is the dependent variable, itx  
represents the set of explanatory variables and iµ  indicates the country fixed-effects. 
We implement the second step through the following error correction model 
(ECM):  
∆ ∆ ∆y y x y xit i i t i i t ij i t j
j
p
ij i t j
j
q
i it= + + + + +− − −
=
−
−
=
−
 φ β λ δ µ ε, ' , * , *' ,1 1
1
1
0
1
,               (2) 
where φ λi ij
j
p
= − −



	
=
1
1
, β δi ij
j
q
=
=

0
, λ λij im
m j
p
*
= −
= +

1
, with j p= −1 2 1, ,..., , and 
δ δij im
m j
q
*
= −
= +

1
, with j q= −1 2 1, ,..., . 
In expression (2), φ i  is the error correction coefficient measuring the speed of 
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.  
The lag order used into ARDL specification is obtained from each country’s 
unrestricted regression model, where the selection is done according to the best 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) associated with each lag specification. The 
homogeneous lag order used in the ARDL model is determined by the highest most 
common lag specification that is chosen in the individual regressions. 
The consistency and efficiency of the PMG estimates depend on several conditions 
regarding the specification. In order to assess the robustness of the empirical model 
some previous diagnostic statistics are applied on individual country ARDL equation. 
The usual battery of statistical tests include the Breusch−Godfrey (1978) test for 
residual serial correlation, the Ramsey (1969) RESET test for functional form 
misspecification, the Jarque-Bera (1980) test for errors normality, and the White 
(1980) test for homoscedasticity. The former two statistics and the latter one have a 
                                                          
22
 The advantage of the use of ARDL models is presented in Pesaran and Shin’s (1999) article. The 
authors point out that these models are robust to integration and cointegration properties of the 
regressors, and for sufficiently high lag orders they are immune to the endogeneity problem, at least as 
far as the long-run properties of the model are concerned. 
 14 
chi-square distribution with p -degrees of freedom, where p  represents the number 
of lags included in regressions, and the third statistic have a chi-square distribution 
with two degrees of freedom. 
Returning to expression (1), the set of explanatory variables is restricted to an 
autoregressive process, which does not depend on contemporaneous values of y . This 
restriction arises from the assumption that there is only one long-run relationship 
between x and y . However, as Calderón, Loayza and Servén (2000) point out, there is 
a possibility for x  to be endogenous in the sense that the factors that affect x  may be 
correlated with contemporaneous effects in y . As such, we thus consider the 
correction proposed by Calderón et al. (2000) for the PMG estimation, which is 
necessary under the existence of contemporaneous correlation across variables. The 
simultaneous causation possibility, i.e., the existence of a feedback between y  and x , 
is captured in what follows by a non-zero σ εu . Using the single equation framework, 
Calderón et al. derive the parameterisation that should be introduced to account for 
the endogeneity of x . 
We now use, for the sake of simplicity, an ARDL 11,   model derived from 
expression (1): y y x x at t t t t= + + + +− −λ δ δ ε1 10 11 1 , for each country, where 
x x ut t t= +−ρ 1 , and 
ε t
tu
iid

	
 ~ ,0 Σ  , Σ =



	

σ σ
σ σ
εε ε
ε
  
  
u
u uu
. The contemporaneous 
correlation between ε t  and ut  is represented by a linear regression of ε t  on ut  as, 
ε
σ
σ
ηεt u
uu
t tu=



	
 + , where ηt  is distributed independently from ut (and, thus, from xt ). 
In this way, the new residual in the ARDL 11,   model is uncorrelated with all 
explanatory variables and given as  
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The ECM implied by the ARDL 11,   given above can be expressed, analogously, 
as in expression (2) 
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Therefore, the long-run relationship can be represented as  
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Regression specification and implementation 
 
Our empirical model initially includes fifteen EU member countries in the analysis. 
However, after performing the four robustness tests on cross-section regressions, we 
observe that only ten countries satisfy the necessary conditions to be included in the 
PMG estimation. In particular, at a conventional statistical level, we observe evidence 
of serial correlation in the residuals of one country, a functional form misspecification 
in another country and the evidence of non-normality of residuals in four countries 
(see Appendix 5). Effectively, then, we exclude from our analysis those countries that 
do not fulfil the necessary conditions to be included in the regression estimation. 
Thus, the model specification is estimated comprehending the following ten countries: 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Finland. 
In addition, as required for a long-run relationship to exist, the estimated 
convergence coefficient φ i  is negative in the ten countries and statistically significant 
in 8 of them. 
Our empirical application estimates the parameters of the following model 
specification: 
, 1 10, 20, 30, 41, , 1
50, 51, , 1 60, 70, 80,
exp exp 0 1
           + 65
it i i i t i it i it i it i i t
i it i i t i it i it i it it
elec elec uer cpi
ideol ideol lps vpr pop
µ λ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ ε
− −
−
= + + + + + +
+ + + + +
 
Conditional on the long-run homogeneity hypothesis, we can rewrite the above 
model as:  
, 1 0 1 2 3
51,
4 , 1 5 , 1 6 7 8
exp 0 1
exp +
65
i t it it it
it i i it it
i t i t it it it
elec elec uer
ideol
cpi ideol lps vpr pop
θ θ θ θφ δ ε
θ θ θ θ θ
−
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∆ = − ∆ +  
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where φ λi i= −1  , θ δ δλz
z z
i
=
+
−
0 1
1
, with z = 1 2 8, ,...,  and θ µλ0 1= −
i
i
. 
The PMG estimator assumes long-run homogeneity, meaning that θ θi = , for 
i N= 1 2, ,..., , where θ β φi i i= − .  
We test the long-run homogeneity assumption and we find that the homogeneity of  
PMG long-run coefficients estimate is not rejected by the modified version of the 
Hausman (1978) test, proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). 23 The Hausman 
statistic test for the long-run coefficients is defined as 
h V VMG PMG MG PMG MG PMGθ θ θ θ θ θ θ= −

	



	 −



	



 −



	
−
^ ^
'
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
1
.  
Under the slope homogeneity hypothesis, the Hausman statistic is asymptotically 
distributed as χ 2  with θ  degrees of freedom.  
                                                          
23
 Hausman test for each long-run coefficient and for the joint long-run coefficients are available 
from the author upon request. 
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Results 
 
In accordance with our expectations regarding the electoral cycle and its effect on the 
government manipulation of the public expenditure composition, we anticipate the 
parameter associated with ELEC0 as being significantly positive and ELEC1 as either 
positive or negative with no statistical significance. A positively estimated parameter 
of ELEC0 variable indicate that pre-election periods induce governments to influence 
budget composition towards current expenditure. An estimated parameter of ELEC1 
variable not statistically significant suggests that there is no empirical evidence of 
government bias in terms of budget composition in post-election periods. 
In observing column A in Table 1, we can verify that governments do manipulate 
budget composition towards current expenditure in the pre-election years, as the PMG 
estimate for ELEC0 parameter demonstrates. Also, the long-run coefficient24 for the 
post-election period, referred to as ELEC1, is not statistically significant, suggesting 
that there is no evidence that governments change the composition of public 
expenditure during these periods. In other words, we find evidence of a political 
budget cycle opportunistically-induced in the pre-election years though we do not 
observe any tendency for a cycle in the post-election periods.25 
 
[ ]insert table 1 about here  
 
We expect a positive parameter estimate for unemployment, that is, higher 
unemployment causes an increase of current expenditure through welfare transfers, 
and a negative parameter estimate for the consumer price index, especially in variable 
estimations subject to time lags, following theoretical arguments that indicate budgets 
to play a stabilisation role which controls inflation through a contraction on current 
expenditure. Given the rivalry in consumption of welfare expenditure as directly 
related to the number of older citizens in the population, we anticipate a positive sign 
for the POP65 parameter estimated. 
We observe that the economic variable parameters estimated are statistically 
significant in determining public expenditure composition. More precisely, we 
observe that the UER and POP65 regressors positively influence a budget bias 
                                                          
24
 The short-run effects are not reported here by space convenience but are available from the author 
upon request. Furthermore, the main objective of this study is to test for the existence of political 
budget cycles, which does not require a detailed analysis of results regarding short-run effects. 
25
 We perform a sensitivity analysis to the parameter estimates in order to assess the robustness of 
results to variation of country coverage by eliminating one country at a time and re-running the PMG 
estimation procedure. Taking into account the width of confidence intervals ( 1.96coef stdD
−
+ ), the 
ELEC0 and ELEC1 parameter estimates reveal to be stable. 
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towards current expenditure (a natural outcome) and the CPI regressor, with a year 
delay, refrain governments in increasing this type of public expenditure to avoid 
inflation. 
We anticipate a negative sign to the estimated parameter of the IDEOL political 
variable. Since public expenditure manipulation occurs irrespective of partisan 
influences, we expect that the ideological position of a government does not 
significantly determine manipulation on the budget composition. 
If the major parliamentary party retains a significant fraction of parliamentary seats, 
the party is less likely to manipulate budget composition in pre-election years, as re-
election is expected. However, if the largest parliamentary party shares only a small 
proportion of seats the reverse is likely to occur. Such parties are potentially more 
ego-rent dependent in terms of budget bias towards current expenditure (party holds 
fewer electorates). As such, we anticipate a negative sign for the estimated political 
variable (LPS) parameter.  
In terms of political variables, the results are not so optimistic as they do not appear 
be relevant in explaining public expenditure composition. However, caution must be 
drawn from these findings given relatively small sample analysis. After performing a 
sensitivity test on the parameters estimated, we confirm that the parameter estimates 
for the political variables are very sensitive to the subset of countries included in the 
analysis, thereby suggesting that we cannot definitely ensure whether these variables 
actually affect public expenditure composition. 
We expect that the greater the number of voters bailouts, the smaller the incentive 
for governments to engage in excessive current expenditure manipulation. This result 
is, however, only expected if voters preferences are prone to capital expenditure or if 
voters have no preference regarding the public expenditure mix. On the other hand, if 
voters prefer current expenditure, we can expect increased budget bias towards current 
expenditure given supported pre-election practices. Ultimately, since voters 
preferences are not observable, the turnout variable effect on the public expenditure 
mix remains an empirical issue. If the estimated parameter of the VPR variable takes a 
negative sign this would suggest that voters have a disciplinary force on governments 
who manipulate current expenditure. An estimated parameter with a positive sign 
would represent that voters have a preferential bias towards current expenditure. 26  
The relationship between the number of effective voters in an election (VPR 
variable) and the composition of public expenditure reveals to be ambiguous. 
Although being statistically significant in our case, we observe that the long-run 
coefficient is also sensitive to the countries covered by the estimation. The long-run 
                                                          
26
 Franzese (2000b) argues that in OECD countries higher voter turnout produces more transfers 
since there is a greater electoral representation of the lower classes. 
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estimates of VPR are unstable since their sign and significance level can vary 
substantially, allowing either a significant negative value or a significant positive 
value, depending on the countries covered by the analysis. Given these results, we 
were unable to assess the impact turnout may hold on public expenditure composition 
and consequently specific constituency preferences in terms the budget mix and 
governmental practices. In order to overcome the limitations of our small sample size, 
a different public expenditure partition should perhaps be considered, namely, 
between targeted and non-targeted expenditures, directions for a future work. 
We reconsider whether observing an entire set of observations for all countries did 
not come at a cost. Namely, including dictatorial regimes during part of a seventy-year 
study span may have contributed towards estimated parameter bias, thus rendering 
ambiguous results for some variables. To evaluate whether the mix of governmental 
regimes influenced our findings we re-ran the PMG procedure that started with a 1978 
data series, when all ten countries were following democratic regimes. We report the 
main results in column B of Table 1.  
We observe that when dictatorial regimes are excluded from the analysis, the 
political budget cycle in pre-election years become more statistically significant. The 
economic and social variables remain statistically relevant. Within the political 
variables LPS emerges as being statistically significant, showing evidence of 
sensitivity in the countries analysed. This result can be influenced by the structure of 
the government power considered in the estimation procedure, since estimation 
included countries governed by single party governments and multi-party 
governments (coalition governments). We then determined that isolating the two 
effects would provide us with further results and as such reperformed the PMG 
procedure considering now only multi-party governments. The estimated parameters 
are presented in column C of Table 1.  
For purposes of estimation we consider only seven countries, thus excluding 
Greece, Spain and Portugal. Interestingly, in comparing the results obtained under this 
subset of countries with our former findings, we determine that once correction for 
contemporaneous correlation is made, the PMG estimates of the electoral cycle are 
strengthened. In fact, there is evidence that countries with higher fractionated power 
resulting from coalition governments are more prone to have pre-election 
manipulation of public finances on current expenditure. This is to be predictably 
expected in multi-party governments that anticipate an upcoming election loss, in that 
they prefer to maximise their utility spending on current expenditure as much as 
possible in the pre-election periods. It also seems that countries with multi-party 
governments slightly increase their current expenditure in the post-election periods. 
This could be interpreted as a reaction by those parties holding a minority position in 
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government. Under these circumstances, parties want to satisfy some fringes of their 
electorate and increase specific types of public transfers in the post-election period. 
Figure 1 provides us with the indication of public expenditure mix manipulation by 
coalition governments in five out of the seven countries considered. In fact, we report 
a systematic and significant bias induced on budget by the German and Finnish 
governments. This phenomenon corresponds to literature findings27 that state coalition 
governments submit to strong internal forces, leading to a more pronounced 
manipulation on public expenditure composition. Balassone and Giordano (2001) 
report a similar result on budget deficit, observing in eight EU countries a tendency 
for coalition governments to increase the budget deficit. 
Accordingly, we can say that single party governments, given higher re-election 
chances, are less prone to manipulate public expenditure. Single party governments 
know that in the likely event of re-election, governments will retrieve utility from 
decisions made in the pre-election periods regarding capital expenditure, although 
visible only in the next legislature. This expectation reduces government incentive to 
excessively increase current expenditure in the pre-election periods. 
When we take those countries where coalition governments prevail, we observe 
that the ideology and the turnout variables are statistically significant. This follows 
from our earlier argument that when governments need to share power with other 
parties, turnout becomes a more relevant variable since each party looks to please their 
respective constituents, accomplishing target expenditures. Similarly, differences on 
ideology appear to be important. However, contrary to our expectations and to early 
work on the issue (see for example de Haan and Sturm (1997)) it seems that right-
wing governments tend to spend more on current expenditure. In a more recent study, 
Darby, Li and Muscatelli (2004) present similar findings to ours, supporting the claim 
that right-wing governments spend less on capital expenditure, and that multi-party 
minorities do not favour public capital as a result of greater re-election uncertainty. 
Further, our sub-sample study of seven countries corresponds to central 
governments of well-established democracies which, according to Brender and Drazen 
(2005), are typically less prone to change the overall size of the budget. A political 
budget cycle may continue to exist on public expenditure composition besides on an 
aggregate level. Identifying whether an established democracy and dominating 
coalition governments holds significant bearing on electoral budget cycle remains an 
unanswered question and opens possibilities for further research. 
                                                          
27
 Hallerberg and Hagen (1999) show that EU states with multi-party governments are not willing to 
delegate to one actor the ability to monitor and penalise those hamper budget agreements. Hallenberg 
and Hagen state that a strong finance minister is only feasible in countries where one-party governments 
are the norm. Although ministers of coalition government can cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma game, 
a budget game, whose solution is unlikely since it involves the need for monitoring and penalising all 
those involved who may have other priority arrangements. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
The main purpose of the current paper is to empirically investigate continued 
politically-induced cycles on public expenditure composition. We achieve findings 
that support theoretical predictions. 
We applied a pooled mean group estimation method to a system of dynamic 
equations to analyse the effects of electoral, economic and political variables on 
public expenditure composition. This econometric technique allows for the speed of 
convergence as well as for short-term dynamics and variances to be different across 
countries, unlike most panel data approaches that impose homogeneity restrictions on 
all of these parameters. 
In contrast to some common findings, claiming that a political budget cycle is more 
easily expected in developing countries where the asymmetry information 
phenomenon is common, an empirical test on EU countries shows that such a 
manipulation still occurs in developed countries, where voters have large access to 
information. 
In looking at the impact of election terms on public finances in terms of 
government public expenditure manipulation, we find evidence of an electorally-
induced increase of current expenditure. Besides the electoral cycle, the dynamic 
analysis reveals that economic variables influence public expenditure.  The 
expenditure component that is directly related to the unemployment rate and to the 
number of older people in the population suggests an increase on current expenditure 
since these variables influence public transfers. The inflation rate with one-period 
delay induces reduced current expenditure, suggesting that budget composition also 
plays a stabilising role. Other variables such as government ideology or turnout are 
not conclusive in terms of their effects on public expenditure composition. The weight 
of the largest party in the parliament reveals to be a relevant variable only for 
countries where single party governments prevail. 
Further, multi-party governments are more sensitive to public expenditure 
manipulation, causing a bias on budget composition in post-election periods as well. 
Under reduced party re-election chances in multi-party governments, each party will 
attempt to please its electorate with counter ego-return benefits from ministers outside 
office after upcoming elections, as suggested in Barreira and Baleiras (2005). 
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Figure 1 – Changes in public expenditure mix towards current expenditure between post- and pre-election years 
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Table 1 – Pooled Mean Group estimates of the long-run coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
1970-2001
Variable PMG estimates t-Statistic PMG estimates t-Statistic PMG estimates t-Statistic
elec0 0,009660 3,5002 *** 0,013604 4,0796 *** 0,013887 4,5026 ***
elec1 0,000778 0,2731 -0,004298 -1,0611 0,004144 1,8137 **
uer 0,005607 11,6082 *** 0,005286 7,7416 *** 0,002719 3,5333 ***
cpi(-1) -0,028822 (-6,6638 ***) -0,048476 (-5,3893 ***) 0,023493 2,0885 **
ideol(l) -0,000063 -0,0584 0,000073 0,0588 0,005581 3,3204 ***
lps -0,024932 -1,1604 -0,051911 (-2,1696 **) 0,014874 0,7499
vpr 0,090868 1,9136 ** 0,050620 0,8897 0,194882 3,0588 ***
pop65 2,003935 9,5333 *** 2,005614 5,2684 *** 2,426867 11,0516 ***
Adj. Speed 0,662753 0,600255 0,677825
Nº of countries 10 10 7
Nº of obs. 310 240 217
Log likelihood 803,0828 580,0512 586,3992
A - Included countries: BEL, DNK, GER, GRE, SPA, FRA, ITA, LUX, POR and FIN
B - Included countries: BEL, DNK, GER, GRE, SPA, FRA, ITA, LUX, POR and FIN
C - Included countries: BEL, DNK, GER, FRA, ITA, LUX and FIN
*:significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level
A - Basic Case
1970-2001
B - Excluding dictatorial regimes
1978-2001
C - Including only countries where
coalition government dominates
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Appendix 1 
 
Description of variables used 
 
Dependent variable 
 
EXP  Public expenditure composition. Difference in every budgetary year between central 
government’s current expenditure weight and its capital counterpart weight. 
 
 
Independent variables 
 
ELECO  Pre-electoral dummy variable. The variable assumes value 1 in the pre-election year 
when election takes place until the fourth month of the year and, in the election year when 
election takes place during or after the fifth month. Otherwise, the variable takes the value 
zero. 
 
ELEC1   Post-electoral dummy variable. The variable takes value 1 in the election year when 
election occurs during the first two months of the year and in the post election year when 
election occurs in or after the third month of the year. Otherwise, the variable takes the 
value zero. 
 
UER  Unemployment rate. 
 
CPI Consumer price index. 
 
IDEOL  Government’s ideological position. In order to harmonise the different data sources 
regarding party ideological scales (see appendix 2), we followed the Carmignami (1999) 
approach which orders each parliamentary party according to a scale from 0 to 10 that 
follws left to right sequence. A party positioned below (above) 5.5 is considered left (right) 
wing (see appendix 3). The variable takes the value zero for the period of democratic 
absence (during the 70s) for Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
 
LPS  Legislative share of the largest party. The corresponding values are found by 
dividing the number of seats of the most representative party in the Assembly by the 
Assembly’s total number of seats. When budgetary options are taken under dictatorial 
governments, the variable is coded as one, since it is assumed that government’s opposition 
had no role in the government’s budgetary decisions. 
 
VPR  Turnout. Ratio between the number of votes cast and the number of people entitled to 
vote in each legislative election. Since elections are not an every year phenomena, middle 
year data were completed according to the methodology suggested by Franzese (2000). The 
number of votes cast and the number of people entitled to vote are obtained by holding the 
information fixed for each variable for each election until the next election. The resulting 
series are then smoothened by a moving average that contemplates previous and last 
variable results.  
 
POP65 Weight of population older than 65. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Description of variable data sources 
 
Dependent variable 
EXP  Public expenditure composition. IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 
with information published until 1999. However, for some countries the series were 
incomplete, implying the use of others complementary statistical sources, namely: National 
Accounts (OECD), National Bank of Belgium, Eurostat, INSEE National Accounts, 
National Accounts - Dutch Department of Finance, European Commission (2001), and 
Bank of Portugal. The published data were adjusted in order to prevent structural breaks 
into the dataset resulting from different data sources. 
 
Independent variables 
ELECO and ELEC1  
 Pre-electoral and post-electoral dummy variables. Information regarding 
legislative election date is electronically available at the following URL: 
www.electionworld.org/. Early election dates were obtained from Wolderdorp et al. (1993, 
1998) for: Belgium for 1971, 1974, 1981 and 1985; Denmark for 1977, 1979, 1981, 1984 
and 1987; Greece for 1977 and 1990; Ireland for 1982, 1987 and 1992; Netherlands for 
1977 and 1989; and, Austria for 1970. Greek legislative election dates were retrieved from 
the URL: www.janda.org. Some election data information is also electronically available in 
the Lijphart Election Archive at the following URL: http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij. 
UER Unemployment rate. OECD (1996, 2000) until 1999, and OECD (2001-a) afterwards. 
CPI Consumer price index. Eurostat (2001) until 1997, OECD (2001-b) between 1998 and 
2000, and Institute Flores de Lemus (2000) to 2001. 
IDEOL Government’s ideological position. Tsebelis and Chang’s database (forthcoming), 
electronically available at: http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/tsebelis/. The authors compiled 
earlier versions of ideological party positioning studies under democratic regimes driven by 
Castles and Mair (1984), Laver and Hunt (1992) and Huber and Inglehart (1995) and 
produced extended work. Since neither of the studies aggregates results for all countries 
considered in the empirical application, a different ideological scale between countries 
according to data availability is used. The positioning of each party, with assembly 
representation, were taken from Huber and Inglehart (1995) for Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and United Kingdom; from Castles and Mair (1984) for 
Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain and France; and, from Laver and Hunt (1992) for 
Luxembourg. The government’s ideological position is completed with Beck et al. (2001) 
for Greece, available electronically at: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/tbeck/. Information 
regarding more recent legislative election results and respective assembly composition 
were obtained through CIA – The World Factbook (2001), available electronically at: 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos. 
LPS  Legislative share of the largest party. Beck et al. (2001) and Tsebelis et al. 
databases (forthcoming). 
VPR  Turnout. The information regarding electorate participation on polls are electronically 
available at: http://idea.int/voter_turnout/westeurope/.  
POP65 Weight of population older than 65. Eurostat (2001) until 1999 and CIA-World 
Factbook. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Descriptive statistics by variable and country 
 
 
Dependent variable −Public expenditure composition. 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables − Unemployment rate and consumer price index. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat.
bel 0,864415 0,98316 0,745194 0,05293
dnk 0,903782 0,942824 0,852543 0,027287
ger 0,879029 0,950138 0,797846 0,040204
gre 0,697784 0,844607 0,492382 0,082255
spa 0,799335 0,912708 0,657241 0,07216
fra 0,899735 0,954032 0,862413 0,02039
ire 0,817262 0,874485 0,666667 0,047804
ita 0,853452 0,942397 0,722579 0,05896
lux 0,765833 0,801542 0,709953 0,026371
nld 0,869867 0,930277 0,824647 0,033771
aus 0,812848 0,894124 0,608644 0,070038
por 0,762171 0,827125 0,707112 0,032968
fin 0,815295 0,937776 0,577798 0,089155
swe 0,912543 0,973481 0,795222 0,048054
uk 0,879104 0,924253 0,799072 0,033622
Panel 0,835497 0,98316 0,492382 0,079168
EXP
 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat.
bel 8,956055 13,21394 1,819141 3,71847 0,918621 1,383177 0,3512 0,334692
dnk 6,460931 11,42002 0,085819 2,837469 0,936498 1,528878 0,2674 0,417008
ger 5,539112 9,799594 0,555618 2,671908 0,9681 1,359326 0,5034 0,261767
gre 6,216075 10,34392 1,687764 3,140802 1,950301 5,470433 0,103 1,943161
spa 13,79637 23,81187 2,528237 7,147104 1,032074 2,049864 0,1369 0,655683
fra 8,087868 12,45683 2,472707 3,286765 0,89503 1,398528 0,2525 0,403719
ire 10,60368 17,35791 3,927534 4,366451 0,88193 1,55854 0,1555 0,466342
ita 9,210909 11,83071 5,278913 2,343398 0,991931 1,942955 0,1424 0,626229
lux 1,218861 2,743249 0 0,802025 0,91388 1,378262 0,3695 0,325872
nld 6,242986 11,93487 0,910259 3,128797 0,934521 1,361996 0,3998 0,282544
aus 2,892561 4,258168 0,971178 1,083882 0,965679 1,411005 0,4284 0,312432
por 5,852943 8,529021 1,686808 1,951693 1,214952 2,818666 0,064 1,006396
fin 6,87629 16,39213 1,69639 4,430095 0,953874 1,561443 0,2272 0,455271
swe 4,173101 10,19006 1,499779 2,975246 1,025642 1,738407 0,2688 0,531126
uk 6,996146 11,80833 2,056395 2,999375 1,012507 1,823022 0,1959 0,541732
Panel 6,874926 23,81187 0 4,511826 1,039703 5,470433 0,064 0,73832
UER CPI
 
 31 
Independent variables − Government’s ideological position and legislative share of 
the largest party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables − Turnout and weight of population older than 65. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat.
bel 5,07155 6,671154 4,193284 0,9502 0,246326 0,4 0,153333 0,079568
dnk 5,10153 7,005085 3,8 1,350878 0,284832 0,4 0,125714 0,09144
ger 5,136794 6,324604 3,704667 1,126668 0,422873 0,51 0,350101 0,055987
gre 4,5 7,6 0 2,550142 0,633826 1 0,5 0,168838
spa 4,086515 8,4 0 3,008515 0,621248 1 0,428125 0,226161
fra 5,483872 7,623656 2,428866 2,333372 0,4392 0,580448 0,251282 0,095799
ire 5,9514 6,460465 5,262189 0,29708 0,446434 0,583333 0,271084 0,084654
ita 6,333256 8,453489 5,920286 0,7501 0,396211 0,58254 0,280952 0,080074
lux 4,803084 5,702941 4,097826 0,658021 0,358976 0,40678 0,288136 0,036889
nld 5,222526 6,455556 3,949485 0,942445 0,306849 0,36 0,233333 0,039196
aus 5,151296 6,29 4,75 0,422364 0,456644 0,519126 0,284153 0,065096
por 4,661571 6,405 0 2,356195 0,589245 1 0,352 0,212652
fin 5,595142 7,065652 4,12917 0,649153 0,370188 0,890909 0,255 0,184955
swe 4,823106 7,275092 4,08 1,156524 0,38134 0,536481 0,111748 0,114394
uk 6,031807 7,8 2,3 2,447406 0,543247 0,62519 0,499205 0,040925
Panel 5,196897 8,453489 0 1,720569 0,433162 1 0,111748 0,166309
IDEOL LPS
 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviat.
bel 0,925133 0,950747 0,903102 0,01541 0,146927 0,1695 0,133 0,010868
dnk 0,866149 0,899255 0,828472 0,019868 0,144934 0,156 0,122 0,010256
ger 0,854451 0,912958 0,777607 0,048137 0,150558 0,1661 0,135 0,006887
gre 0,804734 0,844965 0,746359 0,03145 0,13729 0,1772 0,11 0,018123
spa 0,735702 0,798321 0,665351 0,032498 0,126194 0,1718 0,095 0,023968
fra 0,714068 0,813125 0,66182 0,04258 0,139925 0,161315 0,128 0,01005
ire 0,717576 0,769243 0,643281 0,044789 0,110715 0,114 0,106 0,00287
ita 0,884622 0,933659 0,814351 0,038375 0,140696 0,1835 0,108 0,022039
lux 0,877616 0,901417 0,817736 0,016972 0,134398 0,143 0,125 0,004793
nld 0,80986 0,880028 0,692662 0,053509 0,120573 0,1372 0,101 0,011442
aus 0,883534 0,928955 0,776875 0,047914 0,148698 0,155 0,14 0,004553
por 0,767267 0,982163 0,583982 0,119725 0,122896 0,1562 0,092 0,019845
fin 0,723774 0,822306 0,636483 0,049738 0,124402 0,1503 0,09 0,017406
swe 0,876478 0,917601 0,764842 0,040764 0,165271 0,178 0,136 0,013188
uk 0,731341 0,778301 0,593767 0,040727 0,149409 0,158 0,13 0,008716
Panel 0,811487 0,982163 0,583982 0,086423 0,137526 0,1835 0,09 0,019505
VPR POP65
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Appendix 4 
 
Panel data unit root tests (1970-2001) 
 
Dependent variable − Public expenditure composition. 
 
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS -3.1663 -5.3718
BEL -3.2721 -1.5182 -2.6888 -1.7579
DNK -3.2878 -5.3281 -2.1762 -3.6489
FIN -3.1559 -2.8402 -2.1296 -2.2762
FRA -3.3959 -7.4765 -2.7303 -6.2758
GER -3.0464 -2.4616 -2.4930 -2.7885
GRE -3.1191 -4.7489 -2.2479 -2.8696
IRE -3.0683 -0.9116
ITA -3.0230 -2.3528 -2.4081 -2.7661
LUX -3.4253 -1.6585 -2.4808 -2.4442
NLD -3.0643 -2.4068
POR -3.2605 -4.9003 -2.6056 -4.2452
SPA -3.3842 -1.9661 -2.5651 -2.2770
SWE -2.1012 -1.0390
UK -2.7348 -4.6571
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
-1.9 -26.2862 -1.99 -11.7869
Rejects Ho Rejects Ho
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
-2.53 -16.0686 -2.6 -19.0447
Rejects Ho Rejects Ho
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
-2.576 -5.6508 -2.576 -5.0716
Rejects Ho Rejects Ho
SURADF TEST(15) SURADF TEST(10)
EXP
IPS TEST intercept(15) IPS TEST intercept(10)
IPS TEST interc. and trend(15) IPS TEST interc. and trend(10)
Chang TEST (15) Chang TEST (10)
 
 
Independent variables − Unemployment rate and consumer price index. 
 
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS -4.8965 -1.8164 -5.6613 -3.4203
BEL -5.5999 -4.8851 -3.3483 -4.7925 -5.6664 -1.6819 -4.2301 -1.4563
DNK -4.2623 -4.1556 -2.9066 -2.8033 -4.5401 -4.0453 -3.3986 -2.8958
FIN -4.9961 -2.1156 -2.5194 -1.9774 -5.8343 -3.4331 -4.3064 -3.0478
FRA -5.2573 -4.2496 -3.2654 -2.9978 -5.7422 -4.1253 -4.2578 -3.8523
GER -5.2152 -2.3977 -3.4363 -2.4956 -5.2864 -3.1246 -3.7831 -2.2343
GRE -4.9564 -2.1788 -3.2545 -2.7883 -4.3767 -2.4664 -2.9244 -2.9908
IRE -4.8261 -2.3955 -5.6338 -1.5942
ITA -3.1114 -2.3760 -1.4442 -3.5187 -5.6623 -1.3862 -4.1728 -1.6045
LUX -5.1418 -3.1788 -3.2251 -3.0107 -5.6928 -2.4465 -4.1931 -2.1573
NLD -4.1192 -4.7254 -4.8818 -3.0555
POR -3.2372 -3.5849 -1.5404 -2.9193 -4.5645 0.3659 -3.3862 -0.6305
SPA -5.0554 -4.7730 -3.1990 -3.1956 -4.7619 -1.1846 -3.3877 -1.1708
SWE -5.2061 -2.2125 -4.6580 -1.4432
UK -5.0151 -3.7619 -4.9450 -4.5145
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
-1.9 -8.6841 -1.99 -7.8196 -1.9 -8.2543 -1.99 -6.0487
Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
-2.53 -6.8398 -2.6 -6.4102 -2.53 -1.6649 -2.6 -3.2347
Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Accepts Ho Rejects Ho
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
-2.576 -7.6788 -2.576 -6.3724 -2.576 -3.3497 -2.576 -2.3064
Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Accepts Ho
IPS TEST interc. and trend(15) IPS TEST interc. and trend(10)
Chang TEST (15) Chang TEST (10)
CPI
SURADF TEST(15) SURADF TEST(10)
IPS TEST intercept(15) IPS TEST intercept(10)
IPS TEST interc. and trend(15) IPS TEST interc. and trend(10)
Chang TEST (15) Chang TEST (10)
UER
SURADF TEST(15) SURADF TEST(10)
IPS TEST intercept(15) IPS TEST intercept(10)
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Independent variables − Government’s ideological position and legislative share of 
the largest party. 
 
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS -3.2666 2.6536 -3.2201 -0.6555
BEL -2.7308 -0.8583 -1.9419 -1.6095 -2.6651 -4.2953 -1.2176 -1.9725
DNK -2.8765 0.1814 -2.2784 -3.8891 -2.8983 -5.2089 -2.1620 -4.0261
FIN -3.2103 -4.5997 -2.5736 -3.0919 -3.0805 -2.3069 -2.6263 -1.7712
FRA -3.1548 -1.3421 -2.2818 -1.1831 -2.7711 -7.0898 -2.3837 -4.3423
GER -3.1624 -2.6699 -2.3343 -2.7440 -2.8762 -1.5685 -2.0809 -1.9617
GRE -3.1135 -6.3825 -2.2636 -5.1381 -2.6672 -2.4237 -1.8578 -1.9399
IRE -2.8657 -2.3473 -3.2154 -3.3278
ITA -2.6883 -4.5172 -1.7540 -4.5279 -2.3917 -4.1392 -1.9953 -2.6425
LUX -2.7519 -3.0256 -1.5962 -2.2904 -3.3244 -2.2255 -2.6662 -1.6339
NLD -2.9702 -3.5970 -2.9392 -2.5029
POR -2.7612 -6.8913 -1.9962 -3.9526 -2.3023 -3.8296 -2.0461 -0.6126
SPA -2.6463 0.9059 -1.8161 -0.3659 -3.1422 -5.4757 -2.6893 -2.9411
SWE -3.0440 -2.3079 -2.5789 -2.9669
UK -2.8415 -4.1659 -3.3419 -3.1126
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
-1.9 -5.1215 -1.99 -3.8630 -1.9 -10.5435 -1.99 -9.3178
Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
-2.53 -12.6256 -2.6 -8.7253 -2.53 -30.6691 -2.6 -24.8897
Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
-2.576 -6.1784 -2.576 -4.9112 -2.576 -6.9308 -2.576 -5.2648
Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho
Chang TEST (15) Chang TEST (10) Chang TEST (15) Chang TEST (10)
IPS TEST interc. and trend(15) IPS TEST interc. and trend(10) IPS TEST interc. and trend(15) IPS TEST interc. and trend(10)
IPS TEST intercept(15) IPS TEST intercept(10) IPS TEST intercept(15) IPS TEST intercept(10)
IDEOL LPS
SURADF TEST(15) SURADF TEST(10) SURADF TEST(15) SURADF TEST(10)
 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables − Turnout and weight of population older than 65. 
 
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
AUS -2.2970 3.6600 -4.6775 -5.0960
BEL -3.8237 -4.5464 -2.8295 -4.2907 -5.1541 -0.5743 -3.8399 -0.4524
DNK -2.9904 -2.2888 -2.0889 -1.7057 -2.7767 -4.5342 -1.8633 -3.4563
FIN -3.7368 2.9864 -2.7133 1.4704 -4.2463 -5.4989 -3.2553 -3.4818
FRA -3.7861 -5.5004 -2.9557 -4.8880 -4.7936 -1.9909 -3.6994 -1.6875
GER -3.3391 -2.9917 -2.1080 -1.7680 -4.2416 -1.0978 -3.2316 -1.1234
GRE -3.2488 -2.0039 -2.7289 -2.4907 -2.8834 1.9628 -2.2731 3.1541
IRE -3.6461 0.3110 -3.8281 -0.1448
ITA -3.7947 -1.8052 -2.9207 -1.2849 -4.7692 0.4972 -3.3130 0.0497
LUX -2.9116 -0.2502 -2.0023 -0.0876 -4.1037 -2.4374 -2.5658 -1.6257
NLD -3.8163 0.1425 -4.1595 -4.2113
POR -3.7407 -4.3219 -2.8990 -5.0178 -4.0610 -0.2818 -3.2431 -0.4641
SPA -3.0735 -3.1408 -2.2407 -3.8725 -3.3105 4.7699 -2.5726 4.9935
SWE -3.1263 0.3427 -2.9126 -4.0257
UK -3.4050 0.0522 -4.1952 -4.5171
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
-1.9 10.0072 -1.99 0.9855 -1.9 12.7724 -1.99 16.1946
Accepts Ho Accepts Ho Accepts Ho Accepts Ho
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
-2.53 -13.6560 -2.6 -11.6054 -2.53 -10.9899 -2.6 -9.5511
Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho
Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test Crit.V.(5%) Test
-2.576 -4.3998 -2.576 -4.3946 -2.576 -4.6472 -2.576 -3.8981
Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho Rejects Ho
Chang TEST (15) Chang TEST (10) Chang TEST (15) Chang TEST (10)
IPS TEST interc. and trend(15) IPS TEST interc. and trend(10) IPS TEST interc. and trend(15) IPS TEST interc. and trend(10)
IPS TEST intercept(15) IPS TEST intercept(10) IPS TEST intercept(15) IPS TEST intercept(10)
VPR POP65
SURADF TEST(15) SURADF TEST(10) SURADF TEST(15) SURADF TEST(10)
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Appendix 5 
 
 
Tests on model specification 
 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey's Test Jarque-Bera Test Ramsey's RESET Test White Test
BEL 0,052116 1,275839 3,385411 21,2806 0,909606
DNK 0,184541 4,941352 0,093022 17,07866 0,590126
GER 0,000112 0,214095 1,476925 17,13051 0,889244
GRE 2,304666 0,845987 0,36098 24,0798 0,782926
SPA 0,002729 0,064018 0,05646 19,75415 0,906398
FRA 0,393959 0,073142 1,045848 17,94314 0,373421
IRE 0,481154 94,27131 0,161818 20,9128 0,693
ITA 1,329297 0,694517 0,001692 16,83381 0,410702
LUX 0,605456 0,885231 0,251367 18,13184 0,687865
NLD 2,62076 6,392635 1,306113 21,88212 0,856796
AUS 0,08278 0,775733 14,75666 26,87497 0,859621
POR 0,42349 0,055713 3,834293 18,88052 0,354273
FIN 1,076634 0,090927 2,251494 11,48089 0,965561
SWE 4,444167 46,34976 0,000123 27,49989 0,783061
UK 2,835337 17,47262 1,554527 19,71031 0,635846
Critical Value χ ( ) ,182 28 869=χ ( ) ,12 3 841= χ ( ) ,12 3 841=χ ( ) ,2
2 5 991=
R2
